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Abstract
Reform proposals of health care systems in several countries have advocated varia-
tions of a risk adjustment/capitation system. These proposals face a serious objection:
incentives to risk selection are prevalent in the system. By now, considerable literature
has been devoted to ¯nding ways of mitigating, if not eliminating, this problem, while at
the same time preserving incentives to e±ciency. We contribute to this debate presenting
a transfer system that, under some circunstances, attains both provider e±ciency and no
risk selection. The transfer system extends typical linear capitation formulas. It can be
interpreted as a ¯xed transfer in the beginning of the period plus an ex-post fund at the
end of the period. The novelty rests in the way contributions to this fund are de¯ned.
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11 Introduction
The increasing relevance of the health care sector in modern economies, and the numerous
reform attempts around the world, are, by now, well documented. One reform proposal in
several instances is the development of sophisticated ¯nancing schemes involving capitation
transfers from a funds' collector (the Government, for example) to health care purchasers
and/or providers (the purchaser can coincide with the provider, like in HMOs and fund-
holding GPs). Such transfers call for adequate risk adjustment. Capitation systems and risk
adjustment have been used in the Netherlands, Israel, and the United Kingdom, among other
countries. A similar system appears in proposals for the US, characterized by a single payer
contracting with competing health plans (Newhouse, 1994). The issue of risk adjustment is
also important in the US context, as clear incentives for risk selection in health plans have
been empirically identi¯ed (Newhouse et al., 1997).1
Two main problems with this approach have been exposed in the literature, and several
remedies to mitigate them have been put forward. The problems are risk selection, on the
one hand, and providing incentives to e±ciency of health care delivery, on the other hand.
Cream-skimming means selection by providers (or entities responsible for helth care provi-
sion) of those consumers expected to be pro¯table, given the system of risk-adjusted capitation
payments. A central element is a framework already in place in some countries: a capitation
system against which providers can play.
Avoidance of cream-skimming has been discussed along two main lines: adequate risk
adjustment and pro-competitive regulation. In the latter, we typically see open enrollment
rules and de¯nition of standardized bene¯ts. In the former, the two aspects more extensively
investigated have been the re¯ning of the risk-adjusted capitation, and the imposition of
some sort of high-risk pooling.2 The risk selection issue is far from being settled. In a recent
account by Newhouse (1998) a dark picture of the future prospects is drawn, as the following
quote illustrates:
The physician treating the patient will have more information about the patient's
likely future spending than the risk-adjustment formula will incorporate. As a
result, the incentives to cream and dump will remain.
The recent paper by Van de Ven et al. (1998) discusses the current di±culties in im-
1For a detailed analysis of risk adjustment mechanisms in several countries, see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000),
Tables 5 and 6.
2The literature on risk adjustment is too vast to be fully reviewed here. See the recent overview by Van de
Ven and Ellis (2000).
2proving capitation formulas by estimation of average risks. Marginal improvements in the
capitation formula are obtained at a considerable research cost. Moreover, it is argued that
avoidance of cream-skimming requires strong regulations and possibly some sort of manda-
tory high-risk pooling. In the papers by Shmueli et al. (1998) and Smith (1998), the same
type of analysis is carried out, in the sense that both attempt to econometrically approximate
risk adjusted capitations.3 Newhouse (1996b) states that current adjustments to capitated
payments do leave substantial \between-person variance in expected health care costs unex-
plained." Nonetheless, in a recent work, Van de Ven et al. (2000), based on simulations of
risk-adjusted premiums, conclude that such risk-adjustment is the appropriate strategy to
avoid risk-selection and dumping of patients.
Another way to proceed is to recognise the di±culties in estimating risk-adjusted capi-
tations, which must not be vulnerable to superior information by recipients. This leads to
the economic analysis of risk adjustment. In this vein, Glazer and McGuire (forthcoming,
1998) propose a di®erent adjustment rule. This rule essentially establishes that above average
payments must be associated with higher risk individuals. In a similar spirit, but in a di®er-
ent direction, Encinosa (1999) addresses the economic fundamentals behind risk adjustment
in capitation rates. The major point raised by Encinosa is the importance of cost savings
from treating more than one type of patients. A di®erent way to proceed is to o®er a menu
of reimbursement policies to suppliers of health care, as explored by Sappington and Lewis
(1999). They ¯nd a common result in the literature: both capitation (prospective) payment
and cost-sharing (reimbursement) are present in the optimal transfer system.
An alternative to a simple capitation transfer has been considered: each insurance com-
pany contributes with a given percentage of its insureds to a common pool (a 5% value was
used in the simulations conducted by Banerveld et al. (1995)). Typically, each ¯rm con-
tributes with the worst risks in the portfolio to this fund. The existence of the pool reduces
the incentive to risk selection. The theoretical foundations of this approach seem to rest on a
couple of assumptions. First, risk selection is increasingly costly as we move from the right-
end tail of risk characteristics to the left. This means that cream-skimming with all risks is
less costly than cream-skimming after the worst 5% of each company have been taken out to
a compulsory pool. Second, the incentive for doing cost-reducing e®ort is not much a®ected
by this 5% contribution to the pool.
The argument has not been formalized, up to our knowledge, although the reasoning
behind it seems compelling. The merits of the approach have been discussed in the context of
3See also Van Vliet and Van de Ven (1992).
3simulations. Besides these options, another one was explored by the Swiss federal government,
which introduced a risk-equalization fund.4 The idea of a fund is another avenue to counteract
on cream-skimming. In this paper we explore its merits. The paper makes precise the desired
characteristics of the fund. We focus on how transfers to health plans can be set such that
provider-level e±ciency is achieved, without giving rise to cream-skimming. The discussion
is not only applicable to private health insurance plans, but also to sickness funds (Israel),
Health Maintenance Organizations (US) and general practitioner fundholders (UK).
We propose a payment rule which, whithin the class of linear payments, enlarges the
usual set of instruments. The payment rule, acting on routine information available, avoids
the costs of very ¯ne risk adjustment and does not promote an \information race" between
the payer and the provider.
The reason why the system works is simple. We start, in the usual context, with three
objectives: patients should pay an equal amount, whatever their initial condition is (equity
considerations), moral hazard and risk selection problems should be minimised. However,
only two instruments are available in the typical capitation/prospective payment story: a
¯xed amount and a proportion of actual costs. The payment rule we propose adds one more
instrument { a reimbursement component based on the overall population risk mix.
Moreover, this seemingly complex rule turns out to have a fairly simple implementable
form. It can be applied as a direct payment by patients (equal for each and every patient) plus
a capitation from a central fund (again, just based on counts of enrollees), and an end-of-the-
year adjustment fund.5 The contribution to the fund will be determined by both risk selection
and moral hazard e®ects. A provider that selects good risks will be a net contributor, thus
reducing incentives to cream skim the market. A provider with high costs per patient will have
an incentive to be more e±cient. If the company has a lot bad risks, higher ine±ciency means
higher transfer. However, the actual costs of delivering health care to patients counteracts
the incentive and keeps an interest of the provider in achieving e±ciency.
The paper unfolds in the following way. First, in Section 2, the basic model is presented.
The selection issue is highlighted in the model, as well as the incentive problem in the choice of
cost-reducing e®ort. Next, in Section 3, the imposition of open-enrollment rules is addressed.
The results con¯rm that to provide incentives to e±ciency, capitation payments based on
expected medical expenses must be partial and complemented with (equal) direct payments
4\Insurers having an age and sex structure favorable contribute, while others with unfavorable structure
receive it." Beck and Zweifel (1998).
5We can also interpret it as a reimbursement system with a di®erent ex-post fund. See discussion below for
more details.
4to insurers. This con¯rms the adequacy of the model to investigate the proposed issues.
We proceed to the analysis of the optimal transfer system, linear on the expected medical
expenses. In the absence of risk selection but with incentive problems present, the result
accords with conventional wisdom. It prescribes a partial capitation system, supplemented
by direct contributions. Then, in Section 4, we introduce risk-selection on the basis of an
informational advantage by insurers, and show that an extended linear capitation system is
able to solve both risk selection and cost-reduction incentives problems. This extended linear
system has an interpretation in terms of a capitation, plus an ex-post fund. Its characteristics
make, in principle, simple to implement this ¯nancing structure. Section 5 considers a di®erent
formulation for the e±ciency-e®ort cost and shows how the transfer system has to be adjusted.
Section 6 extends the model to the case of multiple health risks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
For the sake of concreteness, we consider the organizational architecture described in Van de
Ven and Van Vliet (1994), Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992) and Van Vliet (1992), among
others. As it is obvious the same ideas apply to many other settings where capitation transfers
are an issue (like fund-holding GPs and health plans).
A paper close to ours is Ma (1994), in the sense that Ma looks at the cost-reduction and
quality-enhancing incentive e®ects from di®erent payment systems. The main result of his
paper is that a mixed payment system (combining prospective payment and reimbursement)
can give the appropriate incentives to achieve the socially optimal choices of quality and
cost-reducing e®orts, even if there is the possibility of dumping the worst cases. Our setting
di®ers from Ma (1994) in several respects, although the main essential elements are present:
discussion of payment systems and the issue of giving incentives to cost-reducing e®orts.
The main di®erences are that we extend the possible payment system in one direction,
di®erent from the optimal rule derived in Ma (1994) (a piecewise linear rule), and no quality
choices are considered. We introduce the cost-reducing e®ort as a moral hazard variable, as
the transfer recipient is not the provider of health care, as in Ma (1994).
The on-going debate seems to indicate that competition coupled with risk adjustment
is a promising strategy to contain health care rising costs. Newhouse (1996a) argues in this
direction, and supports his view by a model which explicitly considers a sunk cost of developing
new contracts. In the presence of sunk costs, a pooling equilibrium may be sustainable. The
essence of the argument is that sunk costs make unpro¯table to fully discriminate across
5consumers. We contribute to this debate by presenting a model that both (i) formalizes the
arguments of risk selection and incentives to e±ciency; and (ii) allows us to study the optimal
transfer system.
The essential features of the model are the following. There is a central fund, endowed with
a compulsory power to collect contributions from the population. These contributions are a
function of income alone and denoted by T(y), where y is individual income. In tax-¯nanced
systems, the function T(y) is the tax system; in health systems ¯nanced by compulsory social
insurance, this function denotes the way contributions are linked to earned income. The
function T(y) incorporates all the distributive (equity) concerns in the ¯nancing of health
care systems.
For expositional purposes, we consider a homogeneous population with respect to health
needs: in the event of illness, the amount of health care provided is same to all individuals.
This assumption centers our attention on the essential features of the transfer system.
The central fund makes a payment to purchasers of health care (insurance ¯rms, in our
context), denoted by S. This capitation payment may not cover the full insurance premium.
In this case, an extra payment is made by individuals directly to insurers. The exact value of
this payment is determined by health care purchasers. Sticking the closest possible to real-life
facts, we impose this direct payment to insurance companies to be the same for all consumers
that choose a particular health insurance company. That is, insurance companies are not
allowed to price discriminate consumers according to their risk characteristics. This type of
constraint on the behavior of insurance companies has been recognized as inducing opportu-
nities for risk selection.6 The constraint of uniform prices across individuals is widespread.
Not only several European countries have this feature in their national health systems; health
plans in the US have it too. Thus, this is a constraint to be included in the model, also
because it is at the roots of incentives to select risks.
The extensive form of the game is the following. In the ¯rst stage, the Government
or the sickness fund de¯nes the elements/parameters of the ¯nancing system, that is, the
contribution function and the capitation rule. Next, in the second stage, insurance companies
set a °at rate contribution to be paid directy by consumers. Then, consumers choose the
insurance company to contract with. In the third stage, insurance companies set their e®ort
level. Finally, Nature determines whether each consumer is ill, with probability p. Health
care is demanded by sick consumers, and the contract terms are applied.
The insurance system provides full insurance. The assumption is intended to simplify the
6See Newhouse (1984) and Pauly (1984).
6exposition. The introduction of contracts with less than full insurance has been advocated as a
way to discipline demand (moral hazard on the consumption decision taken by sick individuals
facing zero price at this point), and no extreme departure from relatively small copayments has
been seriously proposed. These copayments are not regarded as main ¯nancing instruments.
We choose not to clout our analysis of the ¯nancing system, and we leave out of the model
these well-known arguments for positive copayments.7
The insurance company has to contract with health care providers the supply of health
services. In case of illness, an individual must receive some given units of care (¯xed across
the population), which entail a monetary cost of X.
This monetary cost is dependent on the e®ort of insurance companies to get the best
possible conditions (e.g. value for money). Denote by e the e®ort exerted by insurance
companies. Then X = X(e), with X0(e) < 0;X00(e) > 0: more e®ort decreases total expenses
per patient but does so at a decreasing rate.
The e®ort is our e±ciency variable and it is, by assumption, not observable (more rig-
orously, it is not contractible). The assumption of unobservable e®ort by insurance ¯rms
to achieve better provider performance is reasonable (and even more when the purchaser is
integrated with the provider). It seems to be quite hard to specify in a contract, and monitor
compliance with it, what should be the exact stance of insurance ¯rms in negotiation pro-
cesses with providers, for example, or in the speci¯cation, implementation and monitoring of
medical protocols or guidelines. On the other hand, we assume that medical expenses X(e)
are observable and contractible.
Actual expenditures are determined by random elements and by the e±ciency e®ort.8
Implicitly, we assume that a given value of X can result from a choice of e but also from
other non-observable elements. A word of caution is in order. The traditional principal-agent
theory uses payment schedules to extract information regarding e®ort from the realized value
of expenses. Here, we assume the third-party payer implements reward structures that are
linear in realized treatment cost. As we restrict payment transfers to be linear, contracts of
the sort \Pay S if X equals some value; pay nothing otherwise" are not possible. The set
of feasible payments are more restrictive than it is usual in the principal-agent literature.
However, the capitation transfers correspond to what we observe in reality, and simplicity of
linear rules suggests that applied theory should use this type of assumptions if informative
7There is also the well-known argument of Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976) for o®ering contracts with less than
full insurance. This does not appear here, as no discrimination between consumers is allowed.
8For a recent use of this assumption in health care settings, see Sappington and Lewis (1999). See Holmstrom
(1979) for the seminal contribution of this type of models.
7policy conclusions are to be drawn from the analysis. The same approach has been followed
in previous literature (Ma, 1994, for example). Constraining the set of possible payments
is a way of incorporating policy-implementation constraints into the analysis. As it is well
known, focusing on linear rules comes at a generality cost. However, non-linear sharing rules
are not observed often due, to considerable extent, to the informational requirements needed
for implementation.
Exerting e®ort for cost containment implies a cost C(e) per insured. The marginal cost of
e®ort is positive and increasing, that is, C0(e) > 0 and C00(e) > 0. Examples of this cost are
monitoring the care provided, checking the costs incurred by the provider, etc. The incentive
for insurance companies to perform check-ups and early screening can be seen as included in
the e®ort e. A higher e means pressure of insurance companies to get physicians to perform
such screening activities ot to act as gatekeepers to di®erentiated care.
Only two states of nature are considered: healthy and ill. The `ill' state of nature occurs
with probability p. Individuals in the population di®er in the probability of being ill. Pop-
ulation has unit size and the probability p is distributed in the population according to a
density function g(p) and a distribution function G(p). Consumers are risk averse. We use a
strictly concave function u(¢) to represent the preferences over consumption in each state of
the nature. Expected utility of a consumer endowed with illness probability p is:
V = U(y ¡ T(y) ¡ F) ¡ p ¹ B (1)
where ¹ B is the utility cost of being ill net of the bene¯ts from consumption of health care
(treatment) and we take it to be zero, without loss of generality. Individuals take the contri-
bution system to the central fund as exogenous to their decisions, and choose the insurance
company which announces a lower value for the insurance premium F paid directy by con-
sumers to insurance companies.
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pX(ei)~ g(p j Âi)dp (2)
where Âi is the set of probabilities of consumers that choose insurance company i and ~ g(p j Âi)
is the distribution of p restricted to the set Âi. We also use Âi to denote the set of consumers
that choose ¯rm i. There is some abuse of notation here: ~ g(p j Âi) is not the conditional
distribution of p on Âi. An example illustrates the notation. Suppose that for some p, two
8¯rms share equally the density of consumers, g(p). Then ~ g(p j Â1)=~ g(p j Â2)=0 :5g(p). The
¯rst term in equation(2) is the expected transfer payment (sum of per capita transfer over
all clients of company i, possibly risk adjusted). The second term is the value of insurance
premiums paid directly by consumers to the insurance company. The third term denotes the
cost of e±ciency e®ort exerted by the ¯rm. For the moment, we assume constant returns to
scale of e®ort cost with respect clients.9 Finally, the fourth term denotes expected payments
of health care costs to treat consumers that become ill in group Âi.
The assumption of competition in the insurance market and the rule that precludes the
practice of insurance premium discrimination according to risk characteristics of the individual
means that the only way to make some price discrimination is through cream-skimming (choice
of best risks), which in our model is re°ected in a selective choice of Âi.
One way to act against this type of behavior is to impose rules design so that insurance
companies cannot refuse to contract with a consumer { open-enrollment rules. Another way
to avoid risk selection is to design the transfer rule S in an appropriate way. The next sections
investigate the properties of each of these alternatives.
3 The traditional argument
Under a system of open enrollment, all insurance companies have to charge the same insurance
premium to individuals, and they cannot refuse a consumer that accepts to pay the publicly
announced premium.
According to the timing of the game, we ¯rst characterize the optimal e±ciency e®ort by
insurance companies. The e®ort choice by the insurance company is made after insurance
contracts are signed. The insurance company chooses the e®ort level that maximizes its
expected pro¯ts. This choice is characterized by the following ¯rst-order condition, obtained









X0(ei) ¡ C0(ei) ¡ pX0(ei)
¶
~ g(p j Âi)dp = 0 (3)
The assumption of a competitive insurance market implies that, in equilibrium, insurance
companies must have zero economic pro¯ts. The premium set by the company in a competitive
insurance market must satisfy:
Fi = C(ei)+
R
p2Âi(pX(ei) ¡ Si(p;X(ei)) ~ g(p j Âi)dp
R
p2Âi ~ g(p j Âi)dp
(4)
9This assumption is relaxed below.
10Standard regularity assumptions ensure that second-order conditions are met.
9Take now the system where S is a proportion of expected health care costs. This is, of course,
a strong restriction on the transfer system. While a linear system can be advocated on the
basis of its simplicity, the assumption of simple proportionality may be too restrictive, even
within the set of linear transfer systems. In the next section, we will argue in favor of the use
of a more general linear transfer system.
Since open enrollment rules are usually discussed in the context of proportional payment
systems, we maintain this assumption in order to evaluate conventional wisdom on the charac-
teristics of this organization of health care sector. The open enrollment requirement is not free
of problems. For example, incentives to provide poor quality of care to high-risk individuals
may appear. See further discussion in Van de Ven et al. (2000, p. 319). Accordingly,11
Si = ®pX(ei);®· 1 (5)
The constraint on ® ensures that no transfer exceeds expected health expenditures. The




p2Âi p ~ g(p j Âi)dp
R
p2Âi ~ g(p j Âi)dp
(6)
A ¯rst question to answer is to know whether in equilibrium ¯rms must have the same risk-
mix of patients or not. A second question is to design the optimal transfer system in the
model, given the constraints imposed upon the transfer system.
Before attempting to answer these two questions, it is useful to establish the following
result.
Lemma 1 Under open enrollment and in a competitive insurance market, insurance ¯rms
will choose the same e®ort level for cost reduction.





p2Âi p ~ g(p j Âi)dp
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p2Âi ~ g(p j Âi)dp
(7)




p2Âi p ~ g(p j Âi)dp
R
p2Âi ~ g(p j Âi)dp
(8)
11The analysis can be easily generalized to Si = ®(p)X(ei), thus being non-linear on the probability.
10The zero-pro¯t condition for each insurance company implies:
Fi = C(ei)+X(ei)(1 ¡ ®)¹ pi (9)
Consumers select the insurance company with the lowest value Fi. Thus, in equilibrium, it
must be the case that Fi = F;8i. Otherwise, ¯rms with Fj > minFi will not have consumers
and exit the market.
From the two equilibrium conditions (zero-pro¯t condition plus the ¯rst-order condition
for the choice of ei), we obtain:
Fi = C(ei) ¡ X(ei)C0(ei)=X0(ei) (10)
As Fi = F, it must be the case that ei = e;8i (and ¹ pi =¹ p;8i), as the right-hand side is
monotone on ei. The equilibrium value of ei is given by equation (7). The adjustment to
equilibrium is made through the set of consumers Âi that a ¯rm has. QED The risk mix of
consumers in a company's portfolio can, thus, di®er across companies. The only constraint
implied by a competitive market is an equal value of ¹ pi. Of course, this has some implications
for the admissible con¯gurations of consumers in their risk distribution across companies.
The most important one is that an equilibrium with companies picking up only consumers at
one tail of the distribution of p is not possible. Nonetheless, this is quite less restrictive than
requiring an equal distribution of individuals across ¯rms.
This simple model reproduces some conventional wisdom results. In particular, for a
pure reimbursement system, there is no incentive for insurance companies to pursue cost-
reducing e®ort. For incentives to cost-saving e®ort to emerge, a partial capitation system is
necessary.12
This can be readily seen making ® = 1 (full capitation), and recalling the ¯rst-order











~ g(p j Âi)dp < 0 (11)
Thus, ei is set at the lowest possible value.
This is a result from the general structure of moral hazard problems. The corollary is
the need to set ®<1 for a positive e®ort level result, which can be seen by straightforward





(1 ¡ ®)¹ piX0(ei)+C00(ei)
< 0 (12)
12Other papers that have proposed a partial capitation are Ellis (1998), Ellis and McGuire (1986), Newhouse
(1996, 1998) and Selden (1990), among others. See also Sappington and Lewis (1999).
13The denominator has negative sign as @
2¦i=@e
2
i · 0 to satisfy second-order conditions of the maximization
problem.
11It means that the capitation does not cover the full expected health care expenses if incentives
for cost-reducing e®ort are to be provided. The remaining amount must be obtained through
the charge F, in a competitive environment.
Open enrollment rules are seldom fully enforceable. Insurance companies still have at
their will some ways to select risks which are of quite di±cult monitoring. The emergence of
cream-skimming even under open enrollment rules is leading to proposals of changes aimed
at reducing risk-selection activities. The proposals, so far, had mainly an empirical support
and are based on the idea of \high-risk pooling".14
To investigate the optimal transfer system, we must ¯rst de¯ne the objective function
of the Government. We take it to be the welfare of consumers in the society, aggregated
according to a utilitarian view. The maximization of this social welfare function is constrained
by three sets of conditions: (i) the behavior of insurance companies with respect to the choice
of cost-reducing e®ort; (ii) the competitive insurance market equilibrium condition; and (iii)
the budget constraint on the ¯nancing of the system.15
The third constraint requires that contributions raised are enough to pay for the expected
health care costs. This modelling option makes an extra assumption: higher e±ciency in the
system is passed through to consumers by the lowering of contributions. Another alternative
use of savings associated with e±ciency gains would be to maintain contributions and increase
services in other areas of the Government budget. This would, however, divert us from the
main features of the health system. The other assumption is that the contribution system
does not give rise to ine±ciencies in the economy. It is widely recognized that tax systems
usually have some distortion cost. Since this cost is general to the design of tax systems, not
speci¯c to the health care sector, we opt to set it aside in the analysis.
At the present stage, the set of admissible transfers includes only transfers proportional




Y h(y)U(y ¡ T(y) ¡ F)dy
s:t: ¡X0(ei)¹ pi(1 ¡ ®)=C0(ei)
Fi = F = C(ei)+X(ei)¹ pi(1 ¡ ®);8i
T(y)=®¹ pX(ei)
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Program A
where h(y) is the distribution of consumers by income level, independently distributed from
14See Banerveld et al (1995).
15We retain the assumption of full insurance.
12health risks, with support in Y ; and ¹ p =
R 1
0 pg(p)dp is the average probability of illness in the
whole population. De¯ne £A = f(®;ei;F) : solves Program Ag. This set contains all the
triples than can implement the socially optimal allocation.
Proposition 1 Consider (®;e;F) 2 £A. Then ®<1. That is, the optimal transfer system
in a proportional rule framework implies a partial capitation transfer.




Ey[U(y ¡ ®¹ pX(ei) ¡ C(ei) ¡ X(ei)(1 ¡ ®)¹ pi]
s:t: ¡X0(ei)¹ pi(1 ¡ ®)=C0(ei)
The solution to this problem originates the result. To show this, it su±ces to write down the





QED Due to the need to provide incentives to e±ciency e®ort developed by insurance ¯rms,
the capitation payment cannot cover the full expected health care cost.16 Thus, in the speci¯ed
set of admissible linear transfer schedules, the optimal transfer is a less than complete transfer.
Again, the essential feature is that insurance companies anticipate the e®ect of own decisions of
e®ort on the transfer received. A full transfer would provide no incentives for the development
of e±ciency e®ort. Thus, the usual proportional transfer cannot induce both the e±cient
provision of e®ort and absence of cream-skimming, when the open enrollment rule is not fully
enforceable.
This completes our digression on the conventional wisdom about health care systems. We
have replicated in a formal way the standard arguments for partial transfers of central funds
to insurance companies, as an incentive device to cost-reducing e®orts. We are now in position
to present our main result.
4 An improved transfer system
The rationalization provided in the previous section is still vulnerable to issues of risk-selection
that cannot be ruled out by open enrollment rules. We now explicitly recognize the cream-
skimming problem. The problem was referred to above in general terms, as selective choice
16Moreover, in equilibrium, ¹ pi =¹ p;8i.
13of consumers. We now introduce it in a more speci¯c way. However, by enlarging in a simple,
and feasible, manner the set of linear transfers, we are able to propose a new transfer system
that solves both the cream-skimming and the incentives-to-e±ciency problems.
One feature that caracterizes real world health insurance markets is an informational
advantage of insurance companies (or of providers) over the Government (or the central fund).
The advantage of a better knowledge of risk characteristics of individuals can translate into
a risk selection activity by insurance companies. This, of course, stems from the imposition
of the constraint of no price discrimination across consumers.
In terms of economic modeling, one way of introducing this informational advantage is
to assume that the central fund cannot identify the risk characteristic p, while the insurance
company is able to observe it.
Maintaining the assumption of a transfer system proportional to health care expenses,
under the assumed informational asymmetry between insurance companies and the Govern-
ment, the value to be transferred must be the same for all individuals, as the Government
is not able to di®erentiate. This implies that only the individuals with the lowest value of p
would be chosen by insurance companies, which can mean that consumers endowed with a
high probability of illness will not be able to get private insurance or do so at rather \un-
favorable" terms, from a society's point of view. In the absence of an open enrollment rule,
or if there is no way of monitoring compliance with it, the transfer system must provide the
incentives for ¯rms to not engage in cream-skimming activities.
An obvious way to eliminate the negative e®ect from cream-skimming that some people
(the worst risks) are not able to get health insurance is to set a capitation transfer high enough,
such that all individuals are pro¯table to insurance companies.17 The distributive issues
involved (high pro¯ts for insurance companies) as well as e±ciency considerations (distortion
costs arising from the taxes/contributions levied to get the necessary contributions) make it
an undesirable solution.
We are then left with the alternative of determining the optimal transfer system. The nat-
ural option of re¯ning the capitation formula, in a way such that no signi¯cant informational
asymmetry exists between the central fund and insurance companies, has obvious di±culties.
It may lead to a cost escalation in the monitoring and management of the system, with no
signi¯cant e®ect in decreasing cream-skimming opportunities.
The search for the optimal transfer system must be done in a careful way. With the
17This does not avoid competition for the better risks. It, however, does eliminate the incentive to reject
consumers.
14assumption of informational asymmetry, the transfer must be a ¯xed payment (or, at least,
based on a coarser risk discrimination than the one available to ¯rms). And any ¯xed payment
is not able to counteract on the incentive to cream-skim the market. However, through
enlargement of the set of instruments available, we may consider the option of creating an
ex-post clearing fund, which uses information available on a routine basis. The existence
of ¯nancial °ows with an ex-post clearing fund makes the transfer relevant to the insurance
company to include not only the ¯xed capitation payment but also the ex-post adjustment,
as the insurance company will anticipate and internalize the e®ect of risk selection on the
ex-post contribution to this clearing fund. We now show formally this argument.
Due to its simplicity, we restrict our analysis to linear schedules. The linear transfer per
capita we propose is of the form:
Si = ®0 + ®1¹ piX(ei)+®2¹ pdpX(ei) (14)
The transfer if de¯ned by a ¯xed amount ®0, plus a proportion ®1 of expected health ex-
penditures, where the expectation is based in the risk mix in the set Âi, and a proportion of
expected health expenses, where the expectation is based on average population risk. The def-
inition of the optimal transfer rule consists in the speci¯cation of the parameters (®0;® 1;® 2),
which fully characterizes the transfer Si. The main (linear) payment structures analyzed in
previous literature are particular cases of equation (14). For ®1 = ®2 = 0, one has the pure
prospective system, while for ®0 = ®2 =0 ;® 1 = 1, we have the pure full cost reimbursement
model. The partial cost-sharing model emerges for ®0 > 0;® 1 < 1 and ®2 =0 .




(Fi ¡ C(ei)+Si ¡ pX(ei)) ~ g(p j Âi)dp (15)
Substituting for the transfer system in the pro¯t of the insurance company:
¦i = Gi (Fi ¡ C(ei)+®0 + ®1¹ piX(ei)+®2¹ pX(ei) ¡ ¹ piX(ei)) (16)
where Gi =
R
p2Âi ~ g(p j Âi)dp and ¹ p =
R 1
0 pg(p)dp.
The transfer system must comply with two di®erent sets of constraints: absence of cream-
skimming and provision of incentives to cost-reducing e®ort. Cream-skimming usually means,
in health insurance contexts, selection of good risks. That is, consumers who have expected
health expenses far below the (risk-adjusted) capitation payment. We formalize this intuitive
notion in terms of a contraint of \no cream-skimming" in the following way. Take a partition
Âi of consumers from the population. There is no incentive for cream-skimming provided that
15any other partition Âj gives the same expected pro¯t per capita to the insurance company.
That is, ¦i(Âi)=Gi =¦ i(Âj)=Gj, where Gi( resp. Gj) is the number of consumers in partition
Âi( resp. Âj). This de¯nition is somewhat di®erent from the intuitive notion, as it does not
concentrate only on the idea of \good risks". This is so because we allow for con¯gurations
where an insurance company has both very good and very bad risks, but the risk-mix is, on
average, similar to that of other insurance companies that take only intermediate risks (recall
that the competitive equilibrium does not restrict consumers' distribution to be equal across
companies). It also accommodates the issue that a bigger partition (more consumers) may
imply more good-risk consumers (in absolute terms), and also more bad risks. It is, therefore,
important to de¯ne the notion of \no cream-skimming" in terms of expected per capita pro¯t
to the insurance company.











p2Âi Si ~ g(p j Âi)dp
Si = ®0 + ®1¹ piX(ei)+®2¹ pX(ei)
¦i(Âi)=Gi =¦ i(Âk)=Gk;8i;k
¦i(Âi)=0 ;8i
¡C0(ei)+( ®1¹ pi ¡ ¹ pi + ®2¹ p)X0(ei)=0 ;8i
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
Program B
De¯ne the solution to Program B as £B = f(®0:®1;® 2;e i;F) : solves Program Bg.
Proposition 2 Take µ 2 £B. Then, ®1 =1and ®2 = ¡1. That is, the optimal transfer is
of the form:
Si = ®0 + X(e)(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p) (17)
We proceed now to a sketch of the proof (a formal proof is provided in the Appendix). For
cream-skimming to be unpro¯table, it comes immediately that ®1 = 1. In this case, there is no
incentive of the insurance company to engage in risk selection. The individual pro¯t earned in
each consumer is given by the term in parenthesis in equation (16). This is independent of ¹ pi,
the only variable determined by the set of consumers. There is no gain in making a selective
choice of consumers. With ®1 = 1, the private optimum for the choice of cost-reduction e®ort
is given by:
¡C0(ei)+®2¹ pX0(ei) = 0 (18)
To ¯nd the optimal value of ®2, which has the role of aligning the private incentives with
the social incentives in the choice of e®ort, we need to look at the social planner's problem.
16Note that the proportional rule restricts ®2 = 0, which means that e®ort is set at its lowest
possible value, unless ®1 < 1 as shown previously.






















T(y)h(y)dy ¡ C(e) ¡ ¹ pX(e))h(y)dy (19)










as marginal utility is always positive. Going back to the problem of de¯ning the optimal
transfer system, to have the social optimum choice implemented, it su±ces to make ®2 = ¡1.
This implies a transfer formula given by:
Si = ®0 + X(e)(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p) (22)
We can interpret this transfer system as a lump-sum payment, ®0, plus an ex-post adjustment
fund, X(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p). The proposed transfer formula allows for a socially optimal choice of e®ort
and at the same time it gives no incentive to cream-skimming. The value ®0 is determined,
jointly with F, by the zero-pro¯t equilibrium condition for the ¯rm. In particular, either a
value ®0 = 0 or a value ®0 such that F = 0, are possible. The perfect substitutability between
F and ®0 in the optimal solution is easily observed in the zero-pro¯t condition for insurance
companies.
The choice of a particular value for ®0 depends on the social planner's preferences about
payment to insurance companies in a direct way and through the central fund. That is, the
precise value ®0 hinges upon the social preferences associated with fund transfers and direct
payments. The former may be associated with both income redistribution (positive e®ect)
and heavier use of compulsory power to set contributions according to income, giving rise to
17other distortions in the economy (a negative e®ect). The latter has a negative equity e®ect
but induces smaller distortions in the economy. We do not formalize this choice as it is not
essential to our point.
Although we casted the payment structure in terms of a capitation followed by an ex-post
fund, the same structure can be reinterpreted in the following way:
Si = ®0 +(¹ piXi ¡ ¹ pXi)=¹ piXi +( ®0 ¡ ¹ pXi) (23)
Thus, we can see it as a reimbursement system followed by an ex-post adjustment. This is so
because a reimbursement component must be given to eliminate incentives for risk selection.
The ex-post adjustment fund has two desirable properties. First, it is a ¯nancially bal-
anced scheme (except for the operating costs of the system).18 Second, the system induces a
socially optimal level for the cost-reducing e®ort.
The ¯rst term in the adjustment formula, ¹ piX(ei), is simply the value of health care
costs per capita within the insurance company consumers. The second term, ¹ pX(ei) can be
approximated, for implementation purposes, by the ratio of \sick" people in total population,
multiplied by the average per capita cost of individuals that have been sick in the company's
set of consumers. The information and computations required are of the same order of
complexity as other ex-post funds.
This payment system implies that gains from cost reduction stay with the ¯rm, provided
it does not engage in cream-skimming. As the incentive to select consumers is eliminated,
because the net pro¯t per consumer does not depend on individual risk characteristics, the
payment system provides incentives for e±ciency. This constitutes the crucial di®erence to
other adjustment rules based on average cost per capita in the whole health care sector.
Some comments are in order here. First, if there is some categorization of risks, by sex,
age or other risk adjuster, the same idea of transfer system can be applied within each type
of risk that is identi¯ed by the central fund.
This capitation system does not provide incentives for cream-skimming, retains incentives
for e±ciency and is of relatively easy computation. For the diseases to be explicitly covered
by the capitation transfer, the information needed, at the company level, amounts to total
expenditure per disease, the number of people treated of each disease and the number of
insured consumers.
There is a recurrent issue in health care ¯nancing discussions: that lower quality of care
may be induced by reforms. In our discussion, ensuring quality in provision may be seen
18A proof of this claim is provided in the Appendix.
18as one of the tasks of insurance companies. Thus, obtaining quality is embodied in the
e®ort variable. In this sense, also an optimal quality level will be provided, as long as direct
contracting of the central fund with providers is not more informative in quality issues than
using delegation to insurance companies.
The explicit introduction of quality in provision raises several issues. Up to our knowledge,
in a similar context to ours, only Encinosa (1999) states its role. In his model, the problem of
choice of quality is solved in a very simple way, as it is set at the maximum value to attract
consumers. Of course, other papers have treated quality as an (un)observable element in the
de¯nition of the payment system. These discussions are complementary to our main point,
which is related to incentives for e±ciency by intermediate agents, like insurance companies
and Health Maintenance Organizations.
Another feature of the extended transfer system we propose is administrative feasibility.
The information needed to implement it is available on a routine basis, with a reasonable
degree of accuracy and a (presumably) small time lag. Below, we provide an illustration of
the transfer system.
5 Without constant returns to scale in e®ort cost
A fair criticism of the model in the previous section is the assumption that e±ciency-e®ort
costs are determined in a per capita basis. One readily ¯nd examples of e®orts that result in
cost savings and have a ¯xed-cost nature. A typical such case is the de¯nition of a service
protocol with a general practitioner. It will be applied to every consumer but the cost
incurred (the protocol de¯nition process) is independent of the number of individuals that
will be treated. Therefore, it is of interest to assess the optimal transfer structure under
the assumption that e±ciency-e®ort costs are independent of the number of enrollees of each
insurance company. It will be shown below that a straightforward generalization of the
transfer mechanism will adjust for the ¯xed cost nature of e±ciency-e®ort costs.
We ¯rst characterize the constrained optimal allocation, where the relevant constraint is











The optimal choice of e®ort for each ¯rm is given by:
¡C0(ei) ¡ Gi¹ piX0(ei)=0 ;8i (25)
19Although the number of ¯rms, denoted by n, is taken as exogenous by the social planner, for
the latter to be indi®erent to the number of ¯rms the following must be true. Every individual
is indi®erent, in utility terms, between insurance companies. Given that social welfare was
de¯ned as the sum of individual welfare (across the population), if the above condition is not
met, then social welfare can increase by an appropriate change of one individual from one
¯rm to another.
We now address whether a social planner would like to change the risk composition of an
insurer. De¯ne qi ´
R
Âi pg(p)dp = Gi¹ pi. A social planner does not want to change the risk
mix of consumers if (taking two insurers, say ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2):
¡X(e1)dq1 ¡ X(e2)dq2 = 0 (26)
This requires X(e1)=X(e2)o re1 = e2. To have equal ei;8i, one needs qi = q;8i.B y
de¯nition,
P
i qi =¹ p. From which it follows q =¹ p=n. Therefore, the optimal e®ort choice is
given by:
¡C0(ei) ¡ ¹ pX0(ei)=n = 0 (27)
We turn now to de¯nition of the transfer system. The problem to be solved is:
maxf®0;®1;®2;F;eg
R







p2Âi Si ~ g(p j Âi)dp
Si = ®0 + ®1¹ piX(ei)+®2¹ pX(ei)
¦i(Âi)=Gi =¦ i(Âk)=Gk;8i;k
¦i(Âi)=SiGi ¡ C(ei)+GiFi ¡ Gi¹ piX(ei)=0 ;8i
¡C0(ei)+Gi(®1¹ pi ¡ ¹ pi + ®2¹ p)X0(ei)=0 ;8i
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
Program C
The no-selection constraint is again satis¯ed by ®1 = 1. The no-selection requires that, for
the same number of enrollees, the insurance company does not pro¯t from selecting a di®erent
risk mix. The value ®1 = 1 makes pro¯ts independent of the risk-mix of enrollees, as described
previously.
Next, to induce the optimal e±ciency e®ort, one needs to have






This means that the payment system is ¯rm-speci¯c, and adjusts for the number of enrollees
and for the number of operating ¯rms, due to the existence of strong scale economies.
20De¯ne the solution to Program C as £C = f(®0;® 1;® 2;e i;F i) : solves Program Cg. The
following proposition follows.
Proposition 3 Take µ 2 £C. Then ®1 =1and ®2 = ¡1=(nGi). That is, the optimal
transfer is of the form:







This proposition can be more easily interpreted if we take the total transfer to an insurance
company:







The second term in the right-hand side is similar to the adjustment under constant returns
to scale in the e±ciency e®ort with relation to the number of enrollees. It corresponds to the
selection component. An insurance with a better risk mix will be a contributor, according to
this term.
The last term is a new one, and it results from the ¯xed cost nature of the e®ort. To give
incentives for taking e±ciency e®ort, under increasing returns to scale, the payment system
must also correct for the activity level. The value Gi is the number of enrollees in ¯rm i (or
its market share, as total population has been normalized to one), while 1=n is the market
share if the market is equally divided among the existing n ¯rms. Firms larger than 1=n
receive a higher transfer, as it pays to provide them with stronger incentives for e±ciency.
As before, the payment system can be interpreted as an initial capitation payment, fol-
lowed by an end-of.the-year compensation fund. It is straightforward to check that this
transfer system is balanced, as in equilibrium the sum over all ¯rms of contributions to the
ex-post fund cancel out.
6 Multiple health risks
A natural extension of the model is to consider multiple healthrisks. Consider that an in-





where x¿ is the cost of treating illness ¿ and p¿ is the associated probability of occurrence.





p¿x¿(ei)~ g(p j Âi)dp (33)
21where p denotes the vector of illness probabilities and ~ g(p j Âi) is the joint density of proba-
bilities in set Âi (de¯ned in a similar way to the single-illness case). We take again the initial
assumption of constant returns to scale in the e±ciency-e®ort technology. Accordingly, pro¯ts










~ g(p j Âi)dp (34)
The transfer Si is de¯ned by




¿ p¿x¿(ei)~ g(p j Âi)dp
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These expressions are the natural generalizations of the single-illness case. The constraint of












p¿x¿(ei)~ g(p j Âj)dp
!
=0
Like before, this constraint is satis¯ed for ®1 = 1. Turning to the optimal e®ort level, the









~ g(p j Âi)dp ¡ C0(ei) = 0 (36)









~ g(p j Âi)dp = 0 (37)
Direct comparison of the two ¯rst-order conditions shows that ®2 = ¡1 leads again to the
optimal e®ort level from the social point of view. Hence, the results of the previous section
are generalized to multiple health risks in a natural way.
7 Concluding remarks
In the analysis of ¯nancing systems of the health care sector which rely, at least partially,
on private health insurance markets, it is widely recognized that design of health ¯nancing
structures that use risk adjustment must pay attention to two problems: moral hazard in the
choice of e®orts to achieve/enhance e±ciency and risk selection (cream-skimming).
We present a model that addresses the two issues. It is ¯rst shown that, within a simple
model of linear transfers on expected health care expenses, for incentives for e®ort to exist,
22capitation transfers must be partial ones. This result is, in itself, a particular case of the
general result of incentive theory applied to health care ¯nancing issues. It shows that the
proposed model is able to replicate the conventional wisdom arguments.
The existence of risk selection adds more constraints to the design of the payment system.
Nonetheless, we are able to propose an expanded transfer rule that has two desirable features:
it does not induce cream-skimming and maintains the incentives for insurance ¯rms to exert
cost-reducing e®ort. The proposal has also the advantage of relying only in information that
is usually available and it is ¯nancially balanced.19 The transfer system is de¯ned by: (i) at
the beginning of the year, the central fund pays to the insurance company a value ®0 per
capita, independent of risk characteristics; the insurance company sets some value to collect
directly from consumers. No price discrimation is allowed and open enrollment is enforced;
(ii) at the end of the year, insurance companies participate in an ex-post clearing fund,
where the contribution (positive or negative) of each company is de¯ned as the di®erence
of the company's risk mix to the population risk mix, times the cost per patient treated in
the company. At the equilibrium, as ¯rms are symmetric in our model, average risk and
e±ciency e®ort are equal across companies and no adjustment is necessary in expected value.
The existence of the ex-post fund is necessary to guarantee the right incentives to ¯rms. Its
primary role is to work as a discipline device of deviations to the equilibrium values.
The proposed ex-post fund di®ers considerably from the \voluntary reinsurance pool"
discussed, for example, in Van de Ven et al. (2000).20 The disadvantage of that pool was
clearly identi¯ed with reduced incentives for e±ciency. We showed this is a feature of the
particular form of that pool, not a general characterization of ex-post funds.
Of course, there are some caveats to the model. One of the issues not treated here was
prevention e®ort. If prevention e®ects can, to some extent, be seen as smaller spending in
the event of illness (eventually, even reducing it to zero), then prevention e®ort is included in
a broad interpretation of the e®ort variable. The implications of considering prevention as a
direct change in the risk distribution are left for future research.
Moral hazard on patients' demand is a well-known phenomenon in health care. The
arguments to not to provide full insurance are well understood. We opted to let them out of
the model. Moreover, other rationing e®orts, namely acting on the supply side, and typically
associated with managed care, like utilization review and implementation of protocols, can
19The interested reader can ¯nd an example of computation of this fund and how it compares with the more
standard one in a technical appendix available at http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt/papers.html, or upon request.
20\To ¯nance the pool, each insurer pays to the pool, for each of its pooled clients, the average expenditures
of all pooled individuals in the pool year." Van de Ven et al. (2000, p. 327).
23be included in the e®ort variable. Similarly, it is widely recognized that physicians possess
superior information on patients' characteristics and on patients' needs in each speci¯c illness
episode. The e±ciency problems raised by this information asymmetry and possible measures
taken to mitigate distortions are included, once again, in our broad de¯nition of \e®ort".
Another aspect no explicitly mentioned was quality of care. In health care administration,
quality has a de¯nition closely related to the \e±ciency" ideas from economics literature (e.g.,
reduced number of post-surgery complications). If we see quality in this sense, it is captured
by our e±ciency e®ort variable. Quality as a service (or good) that provides higher value to
the consumer in the even of illness is a more complex issue, and it is left for future research.
Overall, we believe the approach in this paper to be a more relevant one, from an imple-
mentation viewpoint, to the issues at hand (payment systems, risk selection and incentives
for e±ciency) than the introduction of non-linear payment systems.
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26Appendix
A formal solution to the choice of the transfer system














Si ~ g(p j Âi)dp
Si = ®0 + ®1¹ piX(ei)+®2¹ pX(ei)
¦i(Âi)=Gi =¦ i(Âk)=Gk;8i;k
¦i(Âi)=0 ;8i
¡C0(ei)+( ®1¹ pi ¡ ¹ pi + ®2¹ p)X0(ei)=0 ;8i
The ¯rst constraint establishes that the funding system must be balanced (a more generous
system of transfers requires heavier contributions). The second expression is nothing more
than the de¯nition of the allowable transfers.
The third expression reproduces the set of conditions to be satis¯ed in order to eliminate
incentives to cream-skimming (the pro¯t of the insurance company is independent of the set
of consumers selected by the insurer).
The fourth condition is a free-entry condition for a competitive health insurance market.
Finally, the last constraint is the ¯rst-order condition that characterizes the optimal choice
of e®ort. We assume that the regularity conditions for this approach to be valid hold.
The \no cream-skimming" condition can be re-written as:
Z
p2Âi
(Si ¡ pX(ei)) ~ g(p j Âi)dp =
Z
p2Âk




(®1 ¡ 1)pX(ei)~ g(p j Âi)dp =
Z
p2Âk
(®1 ¡ 1)pX(ei)~ g(p j Âk)dp (39)
It is straightforward to see that this condition holds for any two sets of consumers only if
®1 = 1. This result can thus be substituted into the original program.
Take now the zero pro¯t condition in a competitive health insurance market. Solving it
in order to F yields:
Fi = C(Ei)+¹ piX(ei) ¡ Si (40)




T(y)h(y)dy = ®0 + ®1
X
i




From lemma 1, ei = e, and it is possible to write, using ®1 =1 ,
¹ T = ®0 +( 1+®2)¹ pX(e) (42)
From the imposition of open enrollment rules and from the existence of competition among
insurance ¯rms on the insurance premium directly charged to consumers, it must be the case
that, in equilibrium, all ¯rms will charge the same, Fi = F;8i. Moreover, as Gi > 0 and
P
i Gi = 1 by de¯nition, it follows that F =
P
i FiGi. This characteristic of the model allows
us to express social welfare in terms of a representative consumer, for each income level.

























From this, it is clear that ®2 can be freely set to induce the optimal choice of e®ort level, which
happens for ®2 = ¡1 (in which case, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive
constraint has a zero value).
Therefore, a net transfer
Si = ®0 + X(ei)(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p) (44)
allows the system to achieve the optimal level of cost-reducing e®ort, without creating incen-
tives to risk selection.
The value ®0 is determined in order to ensure, together with F, that the participation
constraint of the insurance ¯rm is satis¯ed:
F + ®0 = C(e)+¹ piX(e) (45)
The proposed ex-post fund is ¯nancially balanced
We show now the claim made in the text that the ex-post adjustment process proposed is
¯nancially balanced.
28The contribution of each ¯rm to the fund is
Ai =(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p)X(ei)Gi (46)






(¹ pi ¡ ¹ p)X(ei)Gi (47)














The last equality sign follows from the fact that the set of consumers satis¯es
Âi \ Âj = ; and [i Âi =1 : (49)
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